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For many entrepreneurs, time is a key constraint. They need to invest time to achieve growth, but also lose
time due to recurring crises. We develop a simple stochastic dynamic program to model how an entrepreneur
should prioritize between improving processes to reduce crises vs. harvesting revenue or ensuring future
growth. We show that it is initially optimal to prioritize process improvement: an entrepreneur should strive
for high process quality early in the venture’s growth process. We numerically analyze a simple heuristic
derived from this optimal policy and identify the conditions under which it is (or is not) effective. It performs
near-optimally except when process quality or revenue rate may deteriorate too fast, or when the cost of
process improvement or revenue enhancement is too high. Our work provides a theoretical foundation for
the advice found in the popular entrepreneurship and time management literature to invest time now to
save time later.
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1. Introduction
Consider an entrepreneur who wishes to expand her small business. Her time is severely
constrained, yet some of it is spent dealing with minor but recurring crises. Most of this
entrepreneur’s time is devoted to the routine tasks required for running her business—but
when a few hours of discretionary time become available, how should they be used? Should
she harvest existing opportunities and generate cash, use that time to cultivate future
growth, or use it to improve internal processes and thereby reduce the number of recurring
crises? This is the question that we study here.
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Our interest in studying entrepreneurs’ time management was motivated by two main
observations. First, many of the entrepreneurs with whom we have interacted are indeed
severely time-constrained. Second, even though the popular entrepreneurship literature
does sometimes argue for initially prioritizing process over revenue, it provides no theoret-
ical underpinning for that advice.
The large number of such books testifies to the importance of time management for exec-
utives and entrepreneurs. The core premise of popular time management literature is that
one must invest time today in order to save time in the future; yet absent is an explanatory
theory. Drucker (1967, p. 41) emphasizes the need to prevent the “recurrent crisis” by
reducing it to a routine that an unskilled worker can manage. Griessman (1994, p. 150)
reminds us to “sharpen the axe”, or take time to improve the process even when one is busy.
Mackenzie (1997) argues that we should prevent new fires rather than spend so much time
putting out old ones. Focusing on entrepreneurs, Gerber (2001) emphasizes the need for
building systems (e.g., checklists, operating manuals) that can prevent entrepreneurs from
dropping the ball. Hess (2012) remarks on how much time entrepreneurs spend putting out
fires and argues that they should spend half a day each week thinking about big oppor-
tunities or problems. To prevent recurring crises, Ries (2011) recommends investing as
much time in the process itself as the time lost when a crisis occurs. Although the call
to “invest time now to save time later” has become almost a mantra, we are not aware
of any theoretical foundation that supports specific recommendations concerning exactly
when the entrepreneur should invest time in process improvement.
To develop such a foundation, we propose a simple model of an entrepreneur’s time
allocation decisions. We distinguish between four types of activity: fire-fighting (FF), which
is unavoidable when a crisis occurs; and three other activities—process improvement (PI),
revenue harvesting (RH), and revenue enhancement (RE)—to which the entrepreneur can
devote available time if there is no crisis. We formulate a stochastic dynamic program
to characterize the entrepreneur’s optimal time allocation policy and then characterize
when process improvement should take precedence over other activities. We show that
entrepreneurs should invest more in process improvement early on, when their opportunity
cost of doing so is relatively low. Because the optimal time allocation policy turns out to
be too complex to fully characterize in general, we use some of its structural properties to
derive a simple heuristic to better understand the structure of the optimal policy. From a
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numerical comparative analysis, we find that the heuristic often performs (near-)optimally,
suggesting that in those cases the structure of the optimal policy is the same as that of
the heuristic. The heuristic does not do well, however, when the process quality or revenue
rate may drop too fast or when process improvements or revenue enhancements are too
costly.
This paper’s key contributions are to answer the question we posed at the start and,
in so doing, to establish a theoretical foundation for the advice from the previously cited
popular literature on entrepreneurship. The value of such a foundation is to make the
underlying mechanisms more explicit and also to predict when those popular prescriptions
might not hold, as Le´vesque (2004) points out in her call for more analytical modeling in
entrepreneurship research. The novelty of the current paper is to add a process improve-
ment perspective, which is currently missing in existing work on (entrepreneurial) time
allocation.
Our focus is on entrepreneurs who have an operating business that they seek to expand
by investing their own time. We do not consider, for instance, entrepreneurs who have
received grant or venture funding to conduct research and development into new drugs or
materials—and thus whose main challenge is to develop commercially valuable intellectual
property before their funding runs out.
Below, we first review relevant literature from entrepreneurship and operations manage-
ment in Section 2. In Section 3 we introduce our time allocation model, and in Section 4 we
discuss the optimal policy and a related heuristic. Section 5 contains numerical illustrations
and experiments, and Section 6 contains concluding comments.
2. Literature Review
Our work builds on several streams of literature. The entrepreneurial time allocation lit-
erature argues that having more time available is beneficial for the venture’s success, but
research in this vein usually treats the cost of that time simply as lost wages or reduced
leisure time. Much of the work goes back to Becker (1965), who models how individuals
allocate time between work and leisure. Hakansson (1971) describes how entrepreneurs
should allocate money to various investment opportunities or consumption over their life-
time, but he does not view time as a scarce resource that needs to be allocated. Le´vesque
and MacCrimmon (1997) examine how an entrepreneur can choose to allocate time between
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a wage job and a new venture, where the latter’s success depends on how much time she
invests in it. Several other studies explore how entrepreneurs allocate time between work
and leisure via approaches that are analytical (Le´vesque et al. 2002), empirical (McCarthy
et al. 1990, Cooper et al. 1997), or experimental (Le´vesque and Schade 2005, Burmeister-
Lamp et al. 2012). Our work differs from these studies in two ways. First, rather than
determining how much time overall the entrepreneur should spend on her venture, we ana-
lyze how a given amount of time should be allocated among competing priorities. Second,
we allow the entrepreneur to “create” future time by investing in process improvement.
A rare empirical study on entrepreneurs’ use of time is Mueller et al. (2012); their
Table 1 summarizes earlier work that describes how entrepreneurs shift the focus of their
attention between the venture’s start-up and growth stages. These authors observe six
entrepreneurs in each stage over a period of four days; they then categorize the observed
activities into several types but do not (as we do) differentiate between fire-fighting and
development-oriented activities.
A related body of work is the literature on managerial time allocation; this research goes
back to Radner (1975) and Radner and Rothschild (1975), who model how managers should
allocate time between various projects. Gifford (1992) provides a wide-ranging critique of
this literature. In Seshadri and Shapira (2001), managers balance short-term maintenance
activities (spending time on processes that deteriorate if left untended) and longer-term
developmental activities (which aim to improve performance). These authors stipulate the
proportion of time that managers should spend on both types of activity to maintain system
stability; they also make numerical comparisons among various strategies for allocating
attention. Our work shares some of these elements, but we allow the entrepreneur to invest
in process improvement.
There is some research in entrepreneurial operations that focuses on time, but it typi-
cally addresses timing decisions and not time allocation decisions. Babich and Sobel (2004)
analyze the optimal timing of an initial public offering, and others examine variations on
the theme of when a venture should switch its mode from exploration to exploitation. Arm-
strong and Le´vesque (2002) characterize the optimal time to cease product development
and release the product to market, and Choi et al. (2008) describe how the optimal time
for switching from exploration to exploitation depends on the nature of the opportunity.
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Joglekar and Le´vesque (2009) examine how allocation of funding to research and develop-
ment (exploration) versus marketing (exploitation) should change over time. Lichtenstein
et al. (2007) find that the timing of start-up activities affects the new firm’s likelihood of
emerging successfully.
This paper describes a gradual investment of time in process improvement so as to
reduce the time spent fighting fires; hence it is related to the vast literature on process
improvement. Two seminal works are Fine (1988) and Fine and Porteus (1989), who study
gradual reductions in setup cost and gradual improvements in process quality. The key
differences are that we focus on the investment of time, not money, and that we study
process improvement in the context of entrepreneurship rather than production.
3. Dynamic Time Allocation Model
In this section we develop a model of how entrepreneurs should use their time. We use
a discrete-time model, where each period t (e.g., a week) contains one block (e.g., half a
day) of discretionary time available to the entrepreneur. The time horizon is assumed to
be long enough (one or two years) relative to the frequency of time allocation decisions
that we can assume an infinite horizon.
During each period t, the entrepreneur undertakes one of four stylized types of activ-
ity: fire-fighting (FF), process improvement (PI), revenue harvesting (RH), or revenue
enhancement (RE). Examples of fire-fighting include dealing with suppliers about miscom-
munication in shipments or spending time pacifying a customer who has been kept waiting
because an assistant double-booked the entrepreneur’s time. Process improvement could
amount to clarifying the written specifications for suppliers or upgrading the appointment
scheduling process to prevent double-booking. Revenue harvesting can be selling goods
delivered by a supplier or making a sale subsequent to meeting a customer. Finally, revenue
enhancement might involve devising new products to sell or identifying new segments of
customers to target. We assume that there is no multi-tasking during these discretionary
time periods. (There is substantial evidence from psychology that multi-tasking is coun-
terproductive; see e.g. Levitin 2014.)
The firm’s state is characterized by a triplet (x,R, q), in which x∈R denotes the current
cash position, R denotes the revenue that the entrepreneur would earn if the firm engaged
in RH, and q denotes the current process quality (i.e., the probability that no crisis will
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occur). Revenue rate R and process quality q transition through ordered sets {Rm}Mm=0 and
{qn}Nn=0 respectively, where R0 and q0 and RM and qN are the lowest and highest achievable
states for each. If the cash position falls below zero, then the firm goes bankrupt, the cost
of which is K.
The sequence of events is illustrated in Figure 1. First, the firm goes bankrupt if it
does not have enough cash. Second, the entrepreneur chooses how to allocate her dis-
cretionary time in that period: PI, RE, or RH. Third, a crisis erupts with a probability
that depends both on the process quality and the chosen activity (PI, RE, or RH). Dur-
ing process improvement or revenue enhancement, a crisis erupts with probability 1− qn.
Actively harvesting revenue may induce more crises that the entrepreneur must resolve
immediately—in this case with a higher probability 1−χqn, where 0<χ≤ 1. We assume
that χ is independent of the revenue rate Rm, but this assumption can easily be generalized.
Figure 1 Sequence of events.
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The immediate reward depends on the chosen action (PI, RE, or RH) and on whether
or not there is a crisis (FF). If there is no crisis, then either PI, RE, or RH will generate
a base revenue b. Revenue harvesting generates an additional one-time (net) revenue Rm.
Process improvement and revenue enhancement each involve an additional cost c, which
we assume, for tractability, to be equal. In the event of a crisis, the entrepreneur loses
the base revenue b. Furthermore, we allow the consequences of a crisis during RH to be
more severe by including an additional loss of cFF(Rm)≥ 0 which may depend on the firm’s
revenue rate. We assume that all earnings are re-invested in the firm, and we let δ denote
the intertemporal per-period discount factor that the entrepreneur applies to money; in
this way we capture the opportunity cost of money as well as various risks (e.g., regulatory,
technology) beyond the entrepreneur’s control.
After each action, the state (Rm, qn) can deteriorate stochastically with a probability that
depends on the action taken. Suppose there is no crisis. Following PI (or RE or RH): the
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entrepreneur’s revenue potential Rm deteriorates by one level, if m> 0, with probability α
PI
(or αRE or αRH); process quality qn deteriorates by one level, if n> 0, with probability β
PI
(or βRE or βRH); and no deterioration occurs with probability 1−αPI−βPI (or 1−αRE−βRE
or 1−αRH− βRH). However, if there is a crisis then the entrepreneur must engage in fire-
fighting; we assume no further deterioration in such a period. (Allowing deterioration in
process quality or revenue potential during fire-fighting would further strengthen the case
for process improvement, so this is a conservative assumption.) The state transitions and
immediate rewards are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1 Transitions and immediate net rewards from state (x,Rm, qn).
Decision Crisis? Probability
Immediate Transition
net reward to State Probability
RH
No χqn b+Rm
(x+ b+Rm,Rm−1, qn) αRH
(x+ b+Rm,Rm, qn−1) βRH
(x+ b+Rm,Rm, qn) 1−αRH−βRH
Yes 1−χqn −cFF(Rm) (x− cFF(Rm),Rm, qn) 1
PI
No qn b− c
(x+ b− c,Rm−1, qn+1) αPI
(x+ b− c,Rm, qn) βPI
(x+ b− c,Rm, qn+1) 1−αPI−βPI
Yes 1− qn 0 (x,Rm, qn) 1
RE
No qn b− c
(x+ b− c,Rm, qn) αRE
(x+ b− c,Rm+1, qn−1) βRE
(x+ b− c,Rm+1, qn) 1−αRE−βRE
Yes 1− qn 0 (x,Rm, qn) 1
The only assumption on the sequences {b+Rm} and {qn} is that they are log-concave
increasing in m and n, respectively. (The assumption is automatically satisfied if these
sequences are concave increasing.) This is consistent with decreasing marginal returns in
revenue growth or process improvement, but it also allows for convex–concave patterns
similar to the S-curve commonly observed in new product diffusion (Bass 1969).
Following convention in the entrepreneurial operations management literature, we
assume that the entrepreneur is risk-neutral (cf. Archibald et al. 2002, Buzacott and Zhang
2004, Tanrisever et al. 2012). As in Fine (1988) and Fine and Porteus (1989), we look for
a time allocation policy pi that maximizes the net present value (NPV) of expected future
profit over an infinite horizon:
lim
T→∞
T∑
t=0
δtEpi
[
Π(xt,Rm(t), qn(t) | at) | (x0,Rm(0), qn(0))
]
.
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Here Epi denotes the conditional expectation given policy pi is employed, and
Π(xt,Rm(t), qn(t) | a) is the expected one-period profit (or loss) associated with action a ∈
{RH, PI, RE} given the current state (xt,Rm(t), qn(t)). Here, m(t) and n(t) are stochas-
tic variables defined on {0, . . . ,M} and {0, . . . ,N} respectively, indicating the revenue
rate and process quality state that applies in period t. Specifically, Π(xt,Rm, qn | RH) =
χqn(b+Rm) + (1−χqn)(−cFF(Rm)) and Π(xt,Rm, qn |PI) = Π(xt,Rm, qn |RE) = qn(b− c).
The optimal policy pi∗ is found by solving a dynamic program with the following value-to-
go functions. Since the costs and rewards are bounded, there exists a stationary optimal
policy as T →∞ (Bertsekas 2000) and so we drop the time index t. For n= 0, . . . ,N and
m= 0, . . . ,M , we have
V (x,Rm, qn) =
max{V (x,Rm, qn |RH), V (x,Rm, qn |PI), V (x,Rm, qn |RE)} if x≥ 0,x−K if x< 0.
(1)
In these expressions,
V (x,Rm, qn |RH) = χqn
(
b+Rm + δ(1−αRH−βRH)V (x+ b+Rm,Rm, qn)
+ δαRHV (x+ b+Rm,R[m−1]+ , qn) + δβ
RHV (x+ b+Rm,Rm, q[n−1]+)
)
+ (1−χqn)(−cFF(Rm) + δV (x− cFF(Rm),Rm, qn)),
V (x,Rm, qn |PI) = qn
(
b− c+ δ(1−αPI−βPI)V (x+ b− c,Rm, qn+1)
+ δαPIV (x+ b− c,R[m−1]+ , qn+1) + δβPIV (x+ b− c,Rm, qn)
)
+ (1− qn)(0 + δV (x,Rm, qn)),
V (x,Rm, qn |RE) = qn
(
b− c+ δ(1−αRE−βRE)V (x+ b− c,Rm+1, qn)
+ δαREV (x+ b− c,Rm, qn) + δβREV (x+ b− c,Rm+1, q[n−1]+)
)
+ (1− qn)(0 + δV (x,Rm, qn)),
where [z]+ = max{0, z}. A stationary optimal policy tells the entrepreneur which activity
to invest time in depending on the state of the firm (x,Rm, qn). We next describe this
policy in detail.
4. Time Allocation Policy and Heuristic
In Section 4.1 we examine the structure of the optimal time allocation policy, starting
with the most general formulation and then successively introducing assumptions under
which we attain more precise results. In Section 4.2 we introduce a simple heuristic, which
will help us understand the structure of the optimal policy in those settings where their
performances are similar.
Author: Time Allocation for Entrepreneurs
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 00(0), pp. 000–000, c© 0000 INFORMS 9
4.1. Structure of the Optimal Policy
We first present a structural property of the optimal policy that holds for the most general
model. (All proofs are given in the Appendix.)
Proposition 1. Suppose process improvement is optimal in states (x+ b− c,Rm+1, qn),
(x+b−c,Rm+1, qn−1), and (x+b−c,Rm, qn). Then process improvement dominates revenue
enhancement in state (x,Rm, qn).
According to this proposition, any process improvement (if done at all) has priority over
revenue enhancement. More specifically, if process improvement were optimal in all states
that might be reached while undertaking revenue enhancement (namely, states (x+ b−
c,Rm+1, qn), (x+b−c,Rm+1, qn−1), and (x+b−c,Rm, qn)), then process improvement would
be preferable to revenue enhancement. In short, process improvement should normally
precede revenue enhancement. Recursive application of this logic yields this structural
property of the optimal policy. Process improvement has priority over revenue enhancement
because it creates more time in the future by reducing the frequency of crises, which in
turn creates more opportunities to improve processes, harvest revenue, or enhance revenue.
Although revenue enhancement makes future revenue harvesting more profitable, it does
not create additional time for other activities.
The complexity of the dynamic program in its most general form precludes further
analytical characterization of the optimal policy. We shall therefore introduce a set of
assumptions that can be used (successively) to characterize the optimal policy more pre-
cisely.
Assumption 1. αRE = 0 and βRE = 0; that is, there is no state deterioration during rev-
enue enhancement.
Assumption 2. Either x b− c, or c= b and cFF(Rm) = 0 for all m; that is, there is
no threat of bankruptcy.
Assumption 3. αRH = βRH = 0, αPI = βPI = 0, and δ > δ¯ for some δ¯ < 1; that is, there is
no state deterioration during revenue harvesting or process improvement and the discount
factor is sufficiently large.
Corollary 1. Under Assumption 1, the optimal time allocation policy will involve
multiple cycles of revenue harvesting followed by process improvement followed by revenue
enhancement.
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Corollary 1 states that when there is no state deterioration during RE, the optimal policy
consists of multiple intervals of revenue harvesting—in between which process improve-
ment never immediately follows revenue enhancement. Harvesting revenue may however
be periodically necessary in order to replenish cash and avoid bankruptcy.
If costs are insignificant or if all costs for process improvement or revenue enhance-
ment can be financed by the base revenue b (i.e., if there is no threat of bankruptcy per
Assumption 2), then the optimal policy has the following structure.
Proposition 2. Under Assumption 2, for any Rm there exists a process quality thresh-
old q∗(Rm) such that process improvement is optimal for all states (Rm, qj) with qj ≤
q∗(Rm). Moreover, q∗(Rm)≥ q∗(RM), q¯.
This proposition introduces a minimum process quality, q¯, below which process improve-
ment is optimal at all revenue rates Rm. Maintaining process quality at or above this
threshold has first priority over engaging in either revenue harvesting or revenue enhance-
ment, but this is only a necessary condition for optimality. According to Proposition 2,
there is a threshold q∗(Rm)≥ q¯ up to which the entrepreneur should improve the process. So
if there are future revenue enhancement opportunities, i.e., if Rm <RM , the entrepreneur
may want to invest more time in process improvement than when there are no such oppor-
tunities, i.e., when Rm =RM . This “overinvesting” in process improvement relative to the
long-term target is analogous to building a safety stock of process quality that can be used
later when revenue rates are higher.
Finally, if Assumptions 1 and 2 hold and if also there are no state deteriorations and
the per-period discount factor is sufficiently large (Assumption 3), then the optimal policy
can be fully characterized.
Proposition 3. Under Assumptions 1–3, the optimal allocation of available time in
state (Rm, qn) is determined by the following decision procedure:
1. if qn < q
∗(Rm) then do process improvement ;
2. else if Rm <R
∗(qn) then do revenue enhancement ;
3. else do revenue harvesting.
In the absence of stochastic deterioration or cash constraints, there is at most one
improvement cycle. This cycle is characterized by specific thresholds: first invest time in
process improvement until an improve-up-to level q∗(Rm) has been reached; then invest
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time in revenue enhancement until the enhance-up-to level R∗(qn); then focus on harvesting
revenue.
Our next proposition summarizes the comparative statics of these thresholds.
Proposition 4. Under Assumptions 1–3, the following statements hold :
(i) the optimal improve-up-to level q∗(Rm) is decreasing to q¯ in Rm;
(ii) the optimal enhance-up-to level R∗(qn) is increasing in qn.
Higher revenue rates Rm mean a higher opportunity cost of undertaking process improve-
ments, so the entrepreneur should cease doing them sooner. In contrast, higher process
quality qn increases the value of revenue enhancement, so the entrepreneur should continue
revenue enhancement for longer. The optimal improve-up-to level q∗(Rm) is independent
of the starting process quality qn, and the optimal enhance-up-to level R
∗(qn) is indepen-
dent of the initial revenue rate Rm. Hence the (R,q) state space can be divided into three
contiguous regions, as illustrated in Figure 2.
Figure 2 Optimal policy under Assumptions 1–3.
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Note. Left panel: The optimal actions correspond to three contiguous regions. Right panel: An entrepreneur starting
from a lower revenue rate spends more time on process quality, resulting in a higher final revenue rate.
The following corollary is a direct consequence of Proposition 4.
Corollary 2. Under Assumptions 1–3, the entrepreneur reaches a higher revenue rate
starting from (Ra, qa) than from (Rb, qb), where Ra <Rb for all qa, qb.
An entrepreneur with higher initial revenue rate will end up with a revenue rate lower
than that of an entrepreneur who started with a lower rate. That pattern reflects an impor-
tant feature of the evolution of the value of time: as harvesting revenue becomes more
lucrative, time becomes more valuable—which makes it less in the interest of entrepreneurs
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with higher revenue streams to invest in long-term process improvement activities. This
dynamic is plotted by the process improvement paths (arrows) in the right panel of Fig-
ure 2.
4.2. A Heuristic Perspective: Return on Time Invested
Because the optimal time allocation policy is typically complex, we propose a simple
heuristic—based on the notion of “return on time invested” (ROTI)—whose results closely
mimic those of the optimal policy in many but not all circumstances. Whenever the heuris-
tic does well relative to the optimal policy, we presume that the two have a similar structure.
The ROTI heuristic is based on applying standard Net Present Value (NPV) analysis to
value the flow of future time. Recall that δ is the intertemporal per-period discount factor
applied to money by the entrepreneur and that δ captures the opportunity cost of money
in addition to various risks beyond the entrepreneur’s control. The net present value of
$1 per period forever is thus
∑∞
t=1 δ
t = δ
1−δ . We can similarly view the NPV of an infinite
series of one-unit periods as δ
1−δ periods, where we use the same discount factor as, in
theory, each unit of time can be used to generate a unit of revenue. However, some future
periods become unavailable due to crises, which occur with probability 1− qn. Therefore,
the NPV of available future time is qn
∑∞
t=1 δ
t = δqn
1−δ periods.
To define the crisis-adjusted discount factor ζ(qn) for future time, which takes into
account the likelihood of time being available, ζ(qn) must satisfy
ζ(qn)
1−ζ(qn) =
δqn
1−δ ; hence
ζ(qn),
δqn
1− δ(1− qn) . (2)
Our interpretation of ζ(qn) is illustrated in Figure 3. A higher process quality qn has the
effect of increasing the present value of the supply of future available time. Hence ζ(qn) can
be viewed as a discount factor that incorporates an additional operational risk (of crises)
relative to the monetary discount factor δ. The discount rate applied to time is different
than that for money (but is derived from it). For brevity we will write ζn ≡ ζ(qn).
To assess whether it would be advantageous to undertake process improvement (or rev-
enue enhancement) in a particular period, we assume—in the spirit of Fine and Porteus’s
(1989) last chance policy—that the current period is the last chance to do so and that
process quality (or revenue rate) will remain unchanged in the future. Suppose the current
process quality is qn and that process improvement can increase it to qn+1 > qn for all
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Figure 3 Discounting of available time.
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Note. Left-hand side: The circles represent time periods (e.g., days), some of which are not available because of
fire-fighting. With higher process quality (q2 > q1), there is less fire-fighting and the average interval between two
available time periods is shorter. Right-hand side: The time stream can be equivalently expressed using ζ(q1) and
ζ(q2) to denote constant time intervals corresponding to the expected delay between two available time periods.
future periods. Then the expected amount of time saved each period is qn+1 − qn, so the
total discounted time saved is δ(qn+1−qn)
1−δ . Therefore, one period of process improvement is
worthwhile if and only if
δ(qn+1− qn)
1− δ > 1 ⇐⇒
ζn
1− ζn
(
qn+1
qn
− 1
)
> 1 ⇐⇒ ζn qn+1
qn
> 1.
We define the return on time invested in process improvement as follows:
ROTIPIn , ζn
qn+1
qn
=
0 + ζn+1 + ζ
2
n+1 + ζ
3
n+1 + · · ·
1 + ζn + ζ2n + ζ
3
n + · · ·
. (3)
We likewise define the return on time invested in revenue enhancement as
ROTIREm,n , ζn
b+Rm+1
b+Rm
=
b+Rm+1
b+Rm
· 0 + ζn + ζ
2
n + · · ·
1 + ζn + ζ2n + · · ·
. (4)
Note that ROTIPIn is independent of revenue rate Rm whereas ROTI
RE
m,n depends on
process quality qn. As a result, investing time in PI followed by RE leads to a return on time
invested (ROTIPIn ×ROTIREm,n+1), which is greater than the return from devoting time to
RE followed by PI (ROTIPIn ×ROTIREm,n); this statement is in line with Proposition 1. Under
Assumptions 1–3, the optimal time allocation policy finds the maximum return on time
invested by multiplying all ROTI in process improvements and in revenue enhancements:(
ROTIPIn × · · ·×ROTIPIn∗
)× (ROTIREm,n∗+1× · · ·×ROTIREm∗,n∗+1)
for some n∗ and m∗. The thresholds q∗(Rm) and R∗(qn) in Proposition 3 correspond to m∗
and n∗, respectively, and can be constructed using the ROTI notions just described:
q∗(Rm) = min
n
{
qn
∣∣∣ROTIPIn ·(maxj∏Mj=mROTIREj,n+1
maxj
∏M
j=mROTI
RE
j,n
)
< 1
}
, R∗(qn) = min
m
{
Rm |ROTIREm,n < 1
}
.
The foregoing considerations lead to our simple heuristic, as follows.
ROTI heuristic:
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1. if x+ b− c < 0 then do RH ;
2. else if ROTIPIn
(
maxj
∏M
j=mROTI
RE
j,n+1
maxj
∏M
j=mROTI
RE
j,n
)
> 1 then do PI ;
3. else if ROTIREm,n > 1 then do RE ;
4. else do RH.
The ROTI heuristic prescribes revenue harvesting when the alternative is imminent
bankruptcy. Otherwise, the heuristic prescribes process improvement followed by revenue
enhancement and then revenue harvesting—all based on the thresholds stipulated in Propo-
sition 3. Having defined the optimal policy and a related heuristic, we can now analyze
both numerically.
5. Numerical Study
Using the numerical setup described below in Section 5.1, we present (in Section 5.2) a
numerical illustration of a representative sample path, after which we examine (in Section
5.3) the settings in which the ROTI heuristic does and does not perform well.
5.1. Setup of Numerical Study
We assume the following parameters. The sequence of process quality {qn} is defined by
(1− qn+1) = [0.75 · (1− qn)] for n= {0, . . . ,9} with q0 = 0.2. That is, the likelihood of fire-
fighting declines to 75% of its previous value after every period of process improvement:
from 0.8 to 0.6, then to 0.45, and so forth. The sequence of revenue rates is defined by (b+
Rm+1) =
[
1.2 · (b+Rm) · 100−(b+Rm)100
]
for m= {0, . . . ,15} with R0 =−3 and b= 5. This gives
a convex–concave sequence of increasing revenue rates that resembles the S-curve often
observed with regard to new product diffusion (Bass 1969). In each period, process quality
and revenue rate can deteriorate with probability αi = βi = 0.1 for i ∈ {RE, RH, PI}. We
consider continuous cash-level states x ∈ [−5,80], where x= 0 represents the bankruptcy
threshold. In other words: if cash falls below zero then the firm goes bankrupt, but if cash
rises above 80 then it stays at 80. We assume a large bankruptcy cost, K = 999, to ensure
that avoiding bankruptcy is always desirable. For the discount factor we set δ= 0.95.
We use a standard value iteration algorithm (Bertsekas 2000) to solve for the optimal
policy and value, a mapping from {xl} × {Rm} × {qn} to (respectively) {RH, RE, PI} or
R. We discretize the continuous cash state and interpolate those values that do not fall on
the grid during value iteration. All code is written in Matlab and is available from the
authors upon request.
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5.2. Illustration of the Optimal Policy
The left panel in Figure 4 plots a representative sample path of the optimal policy in the
(R,q) state space, where the vertical and horizontal axes correspond to process quality and
the revenue rate, respectively. Upward (rightward) movement in the graph signifies process
improvement (revenue enhancement). The right panels illustrate the temporal dynamics
of states x, R, and q.
Figure 4 Sample path of the optimal policy.
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Note. In the left panel, the size of each dot is proportional to the frequency with which the corresponding state
is visited. The right panel plots the cash level, process quality, and revenue rate against time. The parameters
are as described in the text: αi = βi = 0.1 for i ∈ {RE, RH, PI}, and c = cFF(Rm) = 1.25b. The initial state is
(x,Rm(0), qn(0)) = (5,2.76,0.38).
Figure 4 illustrates several of our analytical results. The entrepreneur engages in a phase
of process improvement until the improve-up-to level is reached in period 45; then engages
in revenue enhancement until the enhance-up-to level is reached in period 58; and there-
after finally harvests revenue. The entrepreneur may deviate from this pattern either to
harvest revenue (to avoid bankruptcy) or to do process improvement during the revenue
enhancement phase (after a deterioration in process quality). This pattern is a noisy ver-
sion of the one predicted by Proposition 3, which considers neither cash constraints nor
stochastic deterioration. We nonetheless find that, in line with Proposition 1 and Corol-
lary 1, revenue enhancement never immediately precedes process improvement; rightward
motion (in the graph) is never followed by upward motion.
The right panel of Figure 4 illustrates “overinvesting” in process improvement (q∗(Rm)>
q¯), consistent with Proposition 2. Early on (t = 30), when revenue rate is lower, the
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entrepreneur aims for higher process quality (q∗(Rm) > q¯) than later on (t = 120), when
revenue rate is higher.
Although Corollary 2 assumed no stochastic deterioration, its main insights continue
to hold even when process quality can deteriorate. The left panel of Figure 5 illustrates
how the entrepreneur who starts at a higher revenue rate ends up harvesting revenue
at a lower rate. The right panel plots the cumulative (undiscounted) revenue of the two
entrepreneurs following their respective optimal policies. Note that the value function
V (Rm, qn) is increasing in Rm and qn. Hence in period t= 0, the entrepreneur who starts
with both a higher revenue rate and a higher process quality will have a higher expected
future (discounted) profits than the other entrepreneur; but in period t= 120, that other
entrepreneur ends up at a higher revenue rate and a higher process quality and will therefore
have a higher expected future (discounted) profit than the former entrepreneur. This is
because the entrepreneur who starts with a higher revenue rate and a higher process quality
starts harvesting revenue earlier instead of doing process improvement because his/her high
opportunity cost of time, given his/her current revenue rate, inhibits process improvement.
This eventually results in slower accumulation of revenue, as indicated by a less steep slope
in the figure.
Figure 5 Optimal sample paths given different initial revenue rates.
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Note. Parameters are as described in the text: αi = 0.001 and βi = 0.1 for i∈ {RE, RH, PI} and with c= cFF(Rm) = b;
the initial states (Rm(0), qn(0)) are (1,0.25) and (4.2,0.58). The black arrows indicate whether the state transitions
occur only in one direction or both.
5.3. Performance of the ROTI Heuristic
To better understand the structure of the optimal policy, we performed an extensive sim-
ulation comparing the performance of the ROTI heuristic to the optimal policy. We used
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combinations of αi = βi for i∈ {RH, PI, RE} within the set {0,0.05,0.1,0.15} and used c=
cFF(Rm) = λ ·b with λ∈ {0,1,1.25,1.5,2}. To assess the effect of cash constraints and of ini-
tial process quality and revenue rate, we used four starting points—(lo, lo, lo), (lo, lo, md),
(lo, md, lo), and (hi, lo, lo)—for {(x0,R0, q0)} ∈ {5,75}×{−2.6,0.7,5.5}×{0.4,0.75,0.9},
{lo, hi}×{lo, md, hi}×{lo, md, hi} (where lo, md, and hi stand for low, medium, and high
levels of the variables). For each case, we ran 5,000 simulations for T = 330 periods, which
approximates an infinite horizon because
∑∞
t=T+1 δ
t < 10−6. The simulation average of the
sum of discounted profits (V sim) and the optimal value (V opt) were used to compute the
suboptimality gap
(
V opt−V sim
V opt
)
shown in Table 2.
Table 2 Suboptimality gaps of the ROTI heuristic.
Initial Cost of PI and RE (c)
α= β (x,R, q) c= 0 c= b c= 1.25b c= 1.5b c= 2b
0
(lo, lo, lo) 2.2% 0.1% 0.0% 1.6% 3.5%
(lo, lo, md) 2.1% 0.2% 0.2% 2.6% 2.6%
(lo, md, lo) 2.8% 0.4% 0.3% 2.0% 2.9%
(hi, lo, lo) 2.2% 0.0% 0.1% 0.7% 2.7%
0.05
(lo, lo, lo) 2.7% 1.1% 1.0% 0.3% 10.7%
(lo, lo, md) 3.2% 0.7% 1.6% 3.8% 7.6%
(lo, md, lo) 3.1% 0.4% 2.1% 4.7% 6.0%
(hi, lo, lo) 2.7% 0.9% 0.8% 0.3% 13.3%
0.1
(lo, lo, lo) 3.5% 2.6% 6.4% 0.8% 17.7%
(lo, lo, md) 4.0% 2.9% 4.5% 4.8% 16.1%
(lo, md, lo) 3.4% 2.3% 4.4% 2.6% 12.8%
(hi, lo, lo) 3.5% 3.2% 6.9% 0.5% 4.7%
0.15
(lo, lo, lo) 4.0% 6.6% 18.9% 6.2% 24.9%
(lo, lo, md) 4.5% 5.8% 13.0% 8.3% 17.9%
(lo, md, lo) 3.6% 3.4% 12.2% 29.7% 35.1%
(hi, lo, lo) 3.9% 7.2% 21.0% 6.8% 26.1%
Note. b = 5; boldface type indicates values under which the ROTI heuristic has a
suboptimality gap of less than 5%.
For moderate probabilities of deterioration or cost of improvement activities (top rows or
left columns), the ROTI heuristic performs near optimally for many initial states: most of
the suboptimality gaps are less than 5% (boldface values). In particular, the ROTI heuristic
is optimal when c= b, x= hi, and α= β = 0 (Proposition 3). The first column shows that
when c < b, the ROTI heuristic performs near optimally under all deterioration rates. In
that case, fire-fighting (and losing b) is more costly than improvement activities and so the
optimal policy prescribes process improvements—even when a higher rate of deterioration
makes their effect more temporary. In such settings with small suboptimality gaps, the
ROTI heuristic appears to mimic the optimal policy; see the representative sample paths
in Figure 6.
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Figure 6 Representative sample paths: ROTI heuristic and optimal policy.
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Note. The parameters used to generate this graph are αi = βi = 0.1 for i ∈ {RE, RH, PI}, c= cFF(Rm) = 1.25b, and
an initial state of (25,−2.7,0.4).
Comparing the pairs of (lo, lo, lo) and (hi, lo, lo) cases reveals that the ROTI heuristic’s
performance is relatively insensitive to the initial cash position, even though it largely
ignores cash, as initial cash affects the optimal policy and the ROTI heuristic in a similar
fashion. However, the heuristic appears to suffer more from the neglect of cash constraints
when the cost of process improvement is high.
As expected, the heuristic does not perform well when the process quality or revenue
rate has a high (i.e., 10% or more) chance of deteriorating each period or when process
improvements or revenue enhancements incur high monetary costs. In those cases, a sim-
ple time allocation heuristic may not be available. In other cases, though, the fact that
the heuristic performs well indicates that the simple time allocation policy it represents
provides a good guideline for entrepreneurs.
6. Concluding Discussion
The popular time management literature emphasizes adages about investing time now to
save time later, but without a theoretical framework. Using a stochastic dynamic program
to characterize the time allocation policy of entrepreneurs, we show that they should invest
more time in process improvement early on—that is, when the opportunity cost of doing
so is relatively low. We derive a simple heuristic from the optimal policy and then assess
its effectiveness under a wide range of parameters.
Having established the importance of process improvement, one might ask what kind
of process improvements an entrepreneur could make in practice. Gerber (2001, p. 97)
proclaims that entrepreneurs must “work on the business and not in it” and discusses the
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importance of developing the right processes as the firm grows. According to Hess (2012,
p. 79), process improvement activities include designing “rules for mitigating financial and
quality risks”, writing “directions, recipes, instructing an employee how to do specific tasks
or what not to do”, and implementing systems that can produce “reliable, timely data,
or feedback that will reveal variances or mistakes.” Drucker (1967) argues that executives
must systematically monitor their use of time in order to diagnose and eliminate any
sources of waste. He provides practical pointers for process improvement by identifying the
lack of systems or foresight, disorganization, and malfunctioning delivery of information
as the main time wasters. None of these recommended actions are especially novel, yet our
model helps explain why they are useful. Moreover, our analysis encourages entrepreneurs
to think in terms of “return on time invested”, to help decide which process improvement
activities to prioritize, and when to shift their focus from process improvement to revenue
enhancement and harvesting.
Our results have several implications for future research at the intersection of
entrepreneurship and operations management. One could study how entrepreneurs invest
time in activities that save future time and how their decisions relate to the NPV frame-
work. Although some psychology studies compare the investment of time versus money
(LeClerc et al. 1995, Soman 2001, Okada and Hoch 2004, Zauberman and Lynch 2005),
we are not aware of any research that examines the present value of time streams. It is
well known that process improvement efforts are difficult (Repenning and Sterman 2002)
and can even result in negative feedback (Sterman et al. 1997). Future research could prof-
itably investigate the conditions under which entrepreneurs decide to invest time in process
improvement and how that depends on perceived revenue opportunities. Detailed analysis
of how entrepreneurs actually use their time, perhaps building on Mueller et al. (2012), but
using categories of activities as we distinguish here, would also provide important pointers
for which future research would be most valuable for entrepreneurs.
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Appendix
Lemma A-1. ζ(q) is concave increasing in q ∈ [0,1] with ζ(0) = 0 and ζ(1) = δ.
Proof. It is clear that ζ(0) = 0 and ζ(1) = δ. Taking the first and second derivatives then yields ζ ′(q) =
δ(1−δ)
(1−δ(1−q))2 > 0 and ζ
′′(q) =− 2δ2(1−δ)(1−δ(1−q))
(1−δ(1−q))4 < 0 for all δ, q ∈ (0,1). 
Proof of Proposition 1. By Proposition 7.3.1 in Bertsekas (2000), the optimal stationary policy can be
obtained by solving the Bellman equation corresponding to (1). In particular, if the optimal action is PI in
state (x,Rm, qn), then V (x,Rm, qn) = V (x,Rm, qn |PI), where
V (x,Rm, qn |PI) = qn
(
b− c+ δ(1−αPI−βPI)V (x+ b− c,Rm, qn+1)
+ δαPIV (x+ b− c,R[m−1]+ , qn+1) + δβPIV (x+ b− c,Rm, qn)
)
+ (1− qn)(0 + δV (x,Rm, qn))
=
qn(b− c)
1− δ(1− qn) + ζn
(
(1−αPI−βPI)V (x+ b− c,Rm, qn+1)
+αPIV (x+ b− c,R[m−1]+ , qn+1) +βPIV (x+ b− c,Rm, qn)
)
.
Similarly, if the optimal action is RE in state (x,Rm, qn), then V (x,Rm, qn) = V (x,Rm, qn |RE), where
V (x,Rm, qn|RE) = qn
(
b− c+ δ(1−αRE −βRE)V (x+ b− c,Rm+1, qn)
+δαREV (x+ b− c,Rm, qn) + δβREV (x+ b− c,Rm+1, q[n−1]+)
)
+ (1− qn)
(
0 +Vt+1(x,Rm, qn)
)
=
qn(b− c)
1− δ(1− qn) + ζn
(
(1−αRE −βRE)V (x+ b− c,Rm+1, qn)
+αREV (x+ b− c,Rm, qn) +βREV (x+ b− c,Rm+1, q[n−1]+)
)
.
By assumption, undertaking PI is optimal in states (x+ b− c,Rm, qn), (x+ b− c,Rm+1, qn), and (x+ b−
c,Rm+1, q[n−1]+). Then the value function in state (x,Rm, qn) when engaging in RE is
V (x,Rm, qn |RE) = qn(b− c)
1− δ(1− qn) + ζn
(
(1−αRE−βRE)V (x+ b− c,Rm+1, qn |PI)
+ αREV (x+ b− c,Rm, qn |PI) +βREV (x+ b− c,Rm+1, q[n−1]+ |PI)
)
=
qn(b− c)
1− δ(1− qn) + ζn
(
(1−βRE) qn(b− c)
1− δ(1− qn) +β
RE q[n−1]+(b− c)
1− δ(1− q[n−1]+)
)
+ ζ2n(1−αRE−βRE)(1−αPI−βPI)V (x+ 2b− 2c,Rm+1, qn+1)
+ ζ2n(1−αRE−βRE)αPIV (x+ 2b− 2c,Rm, qn+1) + ζ2n(1−αRE−βRE)βPIV (x+ 2b− 2c,Rm+1, qn)
+ ζ2nα
RE(1−αPI−βPI)V (x+ 2b− 2c,Rm, qn+1) + ζ2nαREαPIV (x+ 2b− 2c,R[m−1]+ , qn+1)
+ ζ2nα
REβPIV (x+ 2b− 2c,Rm, qn) + ζnζn−1βRE(1−αPI−βPI)V (x+ 2b− 2c,Rm+1, qn)
+ ζnζn−1β
REαPIV (x+ 2b− 2c,Rm, qn) + ζnζn−1βREβPIV (x+ 2b− 2c,Rm+1, q[n−1]+).
Since RE is feasible in states (x+ b− c,Rm−1, qn+1), (x+ b− c,Rm, qn), and (x+ b− c,Rm, qn+1), we have
V (x,Rm, qn |PI)≥ qn(b− c)
1− δ(1− qn) + ζn
(
(1−αPI−βPI)V (x+ b− c,Rm, qn+1 |RE)
+ αPIV (x+ b− c,R[m−1]+ , qn+1 |RE) +βPIV (x+ b− c,Rm, qn |RE)
)
=
qn(b− c)
1− δ(1− qn) + ζn
(
(1−βPI) qn+1(b− c)
1− δ(1− qn+1) +β
PI qn(b− c)
1− δ(1− qn)
)
Author: Time Allocation for Entrepreneurs
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 00(0), pp. 000–000, c© 0000 INFORMS 23
+ ζnζn+1(1−αPI−βPI)(1−αRE−βRE)V (x+ 2b− 2c,Rm+1, qn+1)
+ ζnζn+1(1−αPI−βPI)αREV (x+ 2b− 2c,Rm, qn+1)
+ ζnζn+1(1−αPI−βPI)βREV (x+ 2b− 2c,Rm+1, qn)
+ ζnζn+1α
PI(1−αRE−βRE)V (x+ 2b− 2c,Rm, qn+1) + ζnζn+1αPIαREV (x+ 2b− 2c,R[m−1]+ , qn+1)
+ ζnζn+1α
PIβREV (x+ 2b− 2c,Rm, qn) + ζ2nβPI(1−αRE−βRE)V (x+ 2b− 2c,Rm+1, qn)
+ ζ2nβ
PIαREV (x+ 2b− 2c,Rm, qn) + ζ2nβPIβREV (x+ 2b− 2c,Rm+1, q[n−1]+)
≥ V (x,Rm, qn |RE).
The last inequality follows because ζn is increasing by Lemma A-1 and because
(1−βPI) qn+1
1− δ(1− qn+1) +β
PI qn
1− δ(1− qn) > (1−β
RE)
qn
1− δ(1− qn) +β
RE qn−1
1− δ(1− qn−1) . 
Proof of Corollary 1. The proof is identical to the proof of Proposition 1. When αRE = βRE = 0, it is not
necessary to assume that PI is optimal in states (x+ b− c,Rm, qn) and (x+ b− c,Rm+1, qn−1). 
Lemma A-2. Under Assumption 2, suppose that
ξn+1ζnγ˜
PI
n − ξn + ξn+1ζnξnβRHγ˜PIn (1− ζn−1γ˜PIn−1) + ξn+1ξn(1−αRH−βRH)(1− ζnγ˜PIn )≥ 0, (A1)
where ξn , δχqn/(1− δ(1−χqn)) and γ˜PIn = (1−αPI−βPI)/(1− ζnβPI). Then, if either PI is optimal in state
(Rm, qn−1) or βRH = 0, then PI is preferred to RH in state (Rm, qn).
Proof. Under Assumption 2, the cash state x remains constant during PI or RE or a crisis. Hence the
cash state has no effect on the optimal decision. Ignoring the cash state, we have the following Bellman’s
equation:
V (Rm, qn) = max
{
V (Rm, qn |RH), V (Rm, qn |PI), V (Rm, qn |RE)
}
; here
V (Rm, qn |RH) = ξn
δ
(Rm + b) + ξn
(
αRHV (R[m−1]+ , qn) +β
RHV (Rm, q[n−1]+) + γ
RHV (Rm, qn)
)
,
V (Rm, qn |PI) = ζn
(
αPIV (R[m−1]+ , qn+1) +β
PIV (Rm, qn) + γ
PIV (Rm, qn+1)
)
,
V (Rm, qn |RE) = ζn
(
αREV (Rm, qn) +β
REV (Rm+1, q[n−1]+) + γ
REV (Rm+1, qn)
)
,
and γa , 1−αa−βa for a∈ {RE, PI, RE}.
Suppose that m> 0 and n> 0. If either m= 0 or n= 0, then the proof is identical once we set (respectively)
αPI = αRH = 0 or βRH = βRE = 0. The proof proceeds by contradiction. We start by assuming that it is
optimal to do RH in state (Rm, qn). On the one hand, since PI is optimal in state (Rm, qn−1), we have
V (Rm, qn |RH) = ξn
δ
(Rm + b) + ξn
(
αRHV (Rm−1, qn) +β
RHV (Rm, qn−1 |PI) + γRHV (Rm, qn |RH)
)
=
ξn
δ
(Rm + b) + ξn
(
αRHV (Rm−1, qn) + γ
RHV (Rm, qn |RH)
)
+ ξnβ
RH ζn−1
1−βPIζn−1
(
αPIV (Rm−1, qn) + γ
PIV (Rm, qn |RH)
)
=
(ξn/δ)(1−βPIζn−1)
(1− γRHξn)(1−βPIζn−1)− ζn−1ξnβRHγPI (Rm + b)
+
ξn(α
RH(1−βPIζn−1) +βRHζn−1αPI)
(1− γRHξn)(1−βPIζn−1)− ζn−1ξnβRHγPIV (Rm−1, qn).
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On the other hand, since RH is feasible in state (Rm, qn+1) and PI in (Rm, qn), it follows that
V (Rm, qn |PI)≥ ζn
(
αPIV (Rm−1, qn+1) +β
PIV (Rm, qn |PI) + γPIV (Rm, qn+1 |RH)
)
≥ ζn
1−βPIζn
(
αPIV (Rm−1, qn+1) + γ
PIV (Rm, qn+1 |RH)
)
≥ α
PIζn
1−βPIζnV (Rm−1, qn+1)
+
γPIζn
1−βPIζn
ξn+1
1− γRHξn+1
(
1
δ
(Rm + b) +α
RHV (Rm−1, qn+1) +β
RHV (Rm, qn |PI)
)
≥ ξn+1γ
PIζn/δ
(1− γRHξn+1)(1−βPIζn)− ζnξn+1βRHγPI (Rm + b)
+
ζn(α
PI(1− γRHξn+1) + γPIαRHξn+1)
(1− γRHξn+1)(1−βPIζn)− ζnξn+1βRHγPIV (Rm−1, qn+1).
Finally, the expression
(ξn+1/δ)γ
PIζn
(1− γRHξn+1)(1−βPIζn)− ζnξn+1βRHγPI =
(ξn+1/δ)γ˜
PI
n ζn
1− γRHξn+1− ζnξn+1βRHγ˜PIn
≥ (ξn/δ)
1− γRHξn− ζn−1ξnβRHγ˜PIn−1
=
(ξn/δ)(1−βPIζn−1)
(1− γRHξn)(1−βPIζn−1)− ζn−1ξnβRHγPI
holds if and only if (A1) holds. Moreover,
ζn(α
PI(1− γRHξn+1) + γPIαRHξn+1)
(1− γRHξn+1)(1−βPIζn)− ζnξn+1βRHγPI
=
(
αPI
1−βPIζn (1− γRHξn+1) + γ˜PIn αRHξn+1
)
γ˜PIn ξn+1
ζnγ˜
PI
n ξn+1
(1− γRHξn+1)− ζnξn+1βRHγ˜PIn
≥
(
αPI
1−βPIζn (1− γRHξn+1) + γ˜PIn αRHξn+1
)
γ˜PIn ξn+1
ξn
1− γRHξn− ζn−1ξnβRHγ˜PIn−1
=
(
(αPI(1− γRHξn+1))
γPIξn+1
+αRH
)
ξn
1− γRHξn− ζn−1ξnβRHγ˜PIn−1
>
(
αPI
βRHζn−1
1−βPIζn−1 +α
RH
)
ξn
1− γRHξn− ζn−1ξnβRHγ˜PIn−1
,
where the first inequality follows from (A1) and the second inequality holds because
(1− γRHξn+1)(1−βPIζn−1)− γPIξn+1βRHζn−1
= (1− ξn+1(1−αRH))(1−βPIζn−1) +βRHξn+1(1−βPIζn−1− γPIζn−1)
= (1− ξn+1(1−αRH))(1−βPIζn−1) +βRHξn+1(1− (1−αPI)ζn−1)> 0.
Therefore, V (Rm, qn |PI)>V (Rm, qn |RH), a contradiction. Hence PI dominates RE in state (Rm, qn). 
Proof of Proposition 2. The proof proceeds by induction. Let
θ= min
{
n |ξn+1ζnγ˜PIn − ξn + ξn+1ζnξnβRHγ˜PIn (1− ζn−1γ˜PIn−1) + ξn+1ξn(1−αRH−βRH)(1− ζnγ˜PIn )< 0
}
,
(A2)
where ξn , δχqn/(1 − δ(1 − χqn)) and γ˜PIn , (1 − αPI − βPI)/(1 − ζnβPI). Define q¯ = qθ. Then, applying
Lemma A-2 yields that V (RM , qn | PI) ≥ V (RM , qn | RH) for all qn < q¯. Consider revenue rate Rm, and
suppose that V (Rm+1, qn) = V (Rm+1, qn |PI) for all qn < q¯. Then, by Proposition 1, we have V (Rm, qn |PI)≥
V (Rm, qn |RE) for all qn < q¯. Furthermore, Lemma A-2 shows that V (Rm, qn | PI)≥ V (Rm, qn |RH) for all
qn < q¯. As a result, V (Rm, qn) = V (Rm, qn |PI) for all qn < q¯. 
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Lemma A-3. For any r ∈ Z+ there exists a δ¯ < 1 such that, for all δ ∈ (δ¯,1], the function ζnζrn+1 qn+1qn is
decreasing in n for any Rm.
Proof. Requiring the function ζnζ
r
n+1
qn+1
qn
to be decreasing in n is equivalent to requiring that
ζnζ
r
n+1
qn+1
qn
≥ ζn+1ζrn+2 qn+2qn+1 or, equivalently, that
q2n+1
qnqn+2
≥ ( ζn+2
ζn+1
)r( ζn+1
ζn
)
; that is,
q2n+1
qnqn+2
≥
(
qn+2(1− δ(1− qn+1))
qn+1(1− δ(1− qn+2))
)r(
qn+1(1− δ(1− qn))
qn(1− δ(1− qn+1))
)
.
Here the left-hand side (LHS) is independent of δ whereas the right-hand side (RHS) is decreasing in δ (since
{qn} is increasing). Hence the inequality is tight for at most one δ ∈ (0,1). When δ = 1, the inequality is
satisfied because the LHS is greater than the RHS—which is equal to 1 given that {qn} is log-concave in qn.
As a result, there exists a δ¯ ∈ [0,1) such that the inequality is satisfied for all δ ∈ (δ¯,1]. 
Lemma A-4. There exists a δ¯≥ 0 such that, for all δ ∈ (δ¯,1], the function
ζn(ζn+1)
i∗(m,n+1)qn+1(Rm+i∗(m,n+1) + b)
(ζn)i
∗(m,n)qn(Rm+i∗(m,n) + b)
is decreasing in n, where
i∗(m,n)≡max
{
i≥ 0 : ζn Rm+i + b
Rm+i−1 + b
≥ 1
}
.
Proof. The proof is based on Lemmas A-1 and A-3. By definition of i∗(m,n+ 1), we have
(ζn+1)
i∗(m,n+1)−i∗(m,n)Rm+i∗(m,n+1) + b
Rm+i∗(m,n) + b
=
i∗(m,n+1)∏
j=i∗(m,n)+1
ζn+1
Rm+j + b
Rm+j−1 + b
≥ 1;
(ζn+1)
i∗(m,n+2)−i∗(m,n+1)Rm+i∗(m,n+2) + b
Rm+i∗(m,n+1) + b
=
i∗(m,n+2)∏
j=i∗(m,n+1)+1
ζn+1
Rm+j + b
Rm+j−1 + b
< 1.
Applying these equalities sequentially and then using (a) Lemma A-3 (while assuming that δ ≥ δ¯) and
(b) the fact that {ζn+1/ζn} is decreasing (by Lemma A-1), we obtain
(ζn+1)
i∗(m,n+1)ζn
(ζn)i
∗(m,n)
qn+1
qn
Rm+i∗(m,n+1) + b
Rm+i∗(m,n) + b
≥
(
ζn+1
ζn
)i∗(m,n)
ζn
qn+1
qn
≥
(
ζn+1
ζn
)i∗(m,n)
qn+1
qn
(ζn+1)
i∗(m,n+2)−i∗(m,n+1)ζn
Rm+i∗(m,n+2) + b
Rm+i∗(m,n+1) + b
=
(
ζn+1
ζn
)i∗(m,n)
qn+1
qn
(ζn+1)
i∗(m,n+2)−i∗(m,n)(ζn+1)
i∗(m,n)−i∗(m,n+1)ζn
Rm+i∗(m,n+2) + b
Rm+i∗(m,n+1) + b
≥
(
ζn+1
ζn
)i∗(m,n)
qn+2
qn+1
(ζn+2)
i∗(m,n+2)−i∗(m,n)(ζn+1)
i∗(m,n)−i∗(m,n+1)ζn+1
Rm+i∗(m,n+2) + b
Rm+i∗(m,n+1) + b
≥
(
ζn+2
ζn+1
)i∗(m,n)
qn+2
qn+1
(ζn+2)
i∗(m,n+2)−i∗(m,n)ζn+1(ζn+1)
i∗(m,n)−i∗(m,n+1)Rm+i∗(m,n+2) + b
Rm+i∗(m,n+1) + b
= ζn+1
(ζn+2)
i∗(m,n+2)
(ζn+1)i
∗(m,n+1)
qn+2
qn+1
Rm+i∗(m,n+2) + b
Rm+i∗(m,n+1) + b
. 
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Proof of Proposition 3. Under Assumptions 1–3, the cash state can be dropped from (1), and therefore
the Bellman’s equation simplifies to:
V (Rm, qn) = max
{
χ(b+Rm)
1− ζn︸ ︷︷ ︸
RH
, ζnV (Rm, qn+1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
PI
, ζnV (Rm+1, qn)︸ ︷︷ ︸
RE
}
. (A3)
Under Assumptions 1–3, the states for which RH is optimal are absorbing. Also, RE→ PI is suboptimal
by Proposition 1. Hence the only possible optimal path consists of one improvement cycle beginning with
sequences of PI (if any) and followed by sequences of RE (if any) and then of RH. The optimal policy can be
characterized by two thresholds: the improve-up-to level (stop PI and do RE) and the enhance-up-to level
(stop RE and do RH). Starting from state (Rm, qn), a policy that consists of j periods of PI followed by i
periods of RE, with RH occurring thereafter, generates value equal to
(ζnζn+1 · · · ζn+j−1) · ζin+j
χ(b+Rm+i)
1− ζn+j .
Thus the maximum value starting from state (Rm, qn) can be written as
V (Rm, qn) = max
j=0,...,N−n
( j∏
j′=1
ζn+j′−1 · max
i=0,...,M−m
{
ζin+j
χ(b+Rm+i)
1− ζn+j
})
. (A4)
Note that, for all j,
arg max
i≥0
{
ζin+j
χ(b+Rm+i)
1− ζn+j
}
= arg max
i≥0
{ i∏
i′=0
ζn+j
b+Rm+i′
b+Rm+i′−1
χ(b+Rm−1)
1− ζn+j
}
= max
{
i≥ 0 : ζn+j b+Rm+i
b+Rm+i−1
≥ 1
}
;
where the first equality follows from the telescoping product and the second equality is by the log-concavity
of {b+Rm}Mm=0. Thus we have derived an expression for the threshold R∗(qn).
We now derive an expression for the threshold q∗(Rm). Let i∗(m,n + j) denote the optimal num-
ber of RE periods in state (m,n + j). Then (A4) can be equivalently expressed as V (Rm, qn) =
maxj=0,...,N−n
∏j
j′=1 ζn+j′ζ
i∗(m,n+j)
n+j
χ(b+Rm+i∗(m,n+j))
1−ζn+j . Note that
arg max
j≥0
{ j∏
j′=1
ζn+j′−1ζ
i∗(m,n+j)
n+j
χ(b+Rm+i∗(m,n+j))
1− ζn+j
}
= arg max
j≥0
{ j∏
k=1
(
ζn+k−1
ζ
i∗(m,n+k)
n+k
ζ
i∗(m,n+k−1)
n+k−1
· b+Rm+i∗(m,n+k)
b+Rm+i∗(m,n+k−1)
· 1− ζn+k−1
1− ζn+k
)(
ζi
∗(m,n)
n
χ(b+Rm+i∗(m,n))
1− ζn
)}
= arg max
j≥0
{ j∏
k=1
(
ζn+k−1
1− ζn+k−1
1− ζn+k
ζ
i∗(m,n+k)
n+k
ζ
i∗(m,n+k−1)
n+k−1
b+Rm+i∗(m,n+k)
b+Rm+i∗(m,n+k−1)
)}
= max
{
k≥ 0 : ζn+k−1 1− ζn+k−1
1− ζn+k
ζ
i∗(m,n+k)
n+k
ζ
i∗(m,n+k−1)
n+k−1
b+Rm+i∗(m,n+k)
b+Rm+i∗(m,n+k−1)
≥ 1
}
;
where the first equality is due to the telescoping product, the second equality results from simplification,
and the third equality follows because the preceding line’s expression (inside large parentheses) is decreasing
in n when δ is large enough by Lemma A-4 and the log-concavity of {qn}. 
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Proof of Proposition 4. We first prove part (ii). According to (A3), the decision to switch from RE to
RH is a stopping action because the entrepreneur will remain in state (Rm, qn) and continue engaging in RH
forever. I.e., while undertaking RE, the entrepreneur faces an optimal stopping problem (Bertsekas 2000).
Doing RE one more step and then doing RH is preferable to doing RH now if and only if
ζnV (Rm+1, qn |RH) = ζn δ
1− δχqn(Rm+1 + b)≥
δ
1− δχqn(Rm + b) ⇐⇒ ζn
Rm+1 + b
Rm + b
≥ 1. (A5)
When {Rm+b} is log-concave, the stopping set is absorbing and so the one-step–look-ahead policy is optimal
(Bertsekas 2000, p. 176). Since the stopping set defined by (A5) is decreasing in qn, it follows that R
∗(q) is
nondecreasing.
We now prove part (i) of the proposition. Suppose that V (Rm+1, qn) = V (Rm+1, qn |PI). Then, by Propo-
sition 1, V (Rm, qn | PI)≥ V (Rm, qn | RE). The rest of the proof amounts to showing that V (Rm, qn | PI)≥
V (Rm, qn |RH). Define θ≥ 1 such that qn+θ ≡ q∗(Rm+1, qn). Then, by (A3),
V (Rm+1, qn) = V (Rm+1, qn |PI) = ζn · · · ζn+θ−1V (Rm+1, qn+θ).
It follows from our definition of θ that V (Rm+1, qn+θ)>V (Rm+1, qn+θ |PI). We must therefore consider two
cases: either when RH or when RE is optimal in state (Rm+1, qn+θ). Assume first that V (Rm+1, qn+θ) =
V (Rm+1, qn+θ |RH). Since V (Rm+1, qn |PI)>V (Rm+1, qn |RH), we have
ζn · · · ζn+θ−1 δ
1− δχqn+θ(Rm+1 + b)>
δ
1− δχqn(Rm+1 + b), and therefore
V (Rm, qn |PI) = ζnV (Rm, qn+1)≥ ζn · · · ζn+θ−1V (Rm, qn+θ)≥ ζn · · · ζn+θ−1 δ
1− δχqn+θ(Rm + b)
>
δ
1− δχqn(Rm + b) = V (Rm, qn |RH).
Now if V (Rm+1, qn+θ) = V (Rm+1, qn+θ |RE), then by (A5) we have ζn+θ Rm+2+bRm+1+b > 1. Thus,
V (Rm, qn |PI) = ζnV (Rm, qn+1)≥ ζn · · · ζn+θ−1ζn+θV (Rm+1, qn+θ)
= ζn+θV (Rm+1, qn)≥ ζn+θV (Rm+1, qn |RH) = ζn+θ δ
1− δχqn(Rm+1 + b).
Because {Rm + b} is log-concave, Rm+1+bRm+b ≥
Rm+2+b
Rm+1+b
. Hence ζn+θ
Rm+1+b
Rm+b
> 1; therefore, V (Rm, qn | PI) >
ζn+θ
δ
1−δχqn(Rm + b) = V (Rm, qn |RH).
In sum, we have found that V (Rm, qn | PI)>max{V (Rm, qn |RH), V (Rm, qn |RE)}; that is, V (Rm, qn) =
V (Rm, qn |PI) when V (Rm+1, qn) = V (Rm+1, qn |PI). So if q∗(Rm+1, qn)> qn, then q∗(Rm, qn)> qn. 
Proof of Corollary 2. This result follows directly from Proposition 4. 
